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I. INTRODUCTION
What is the effect and reach of American law in a war zone such as
Iraq? A recent case, United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles,'
has presented an amalgam of apparently conflicting policies and princi-
ples that offers some food for thought on one aspect of this admittedly
broad question. The case is a civil qui tam action2 under the False Claims
Act (FCA) 3 against an American contractor, Custer Battles, Inc. In the
t J.D. candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2007; B.A., English, University of Florida, 1992.
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1. 376 F. Supp. 2d 617 (E.D. Va. 2005) [hereinafter Custer Battles]. This Note focuses on one
published opinion from this complicated case. The court has granted defendants' Rule 50 motion,
vacating a jury's finding of Custer Battles' liability. United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Bat-
tles, LLC, 444 F. Supp. 2d 678 (E.D. Va. 2006) [hereinafter Custer Battles fl]. The court initially put
aside the question of whether the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was an American agency
for purposes of the False Claims Act (FCA). Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 620-23. However, in
deciding defendants' post-trial Rule 50 motion, the court found that the CPA was not an American
entity-such that a fraudulent act against it would not give rise to FCA liability. Custer Battles II,
444 F. Supp. 2d at 679. Unless otherwise noted, this Note will focus on the initial summary judg-
ment decision, Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 617.
2. "An action brought under a statute that allows a private person to sue for a penalty, part of
which the government or some specified public institution will receive." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1282 (8th ed. 2004).
3.31 U.S.C. § 3729-3812 (2000). The FCA reaches beyond military contracts and often impli-
cates other agencies, especially in the health care field. For a useful summary of the FCA, its provi-
sions, and its scope, see http://www.taf.org/whyfca.htm (last visited February 19, 2007). See also
infra Part II. For statistics on the frequency and relative success of qui tam actions with respect to
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early months after the invasion, Custer Battles defrauded the primarily
American led and operated Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)4-the
initial governing body in Iraq after the invasion-of millions of dollars
by presenting false or inflated invoices to U.S. government officials and
by failing to properly perform contracts. 5
Custer Battles was formed in 1989 and "provide[s] support services
to the United States and other governments engaged in wars and conflicts
around the globe."6 The company is an "international business risk con-
sultancy" that "provides objective risk management and security consult-
ing services of the highest quality and within an ethical framework."7
According to its website, Custer Battles offers an array of security ser-
vices, including security details and convoys, as well as explosive detec-
tion services. The problem in this case, however, is that Custer Battles
engaged in fraudulent conduct that cost the CPA millions of dollars for
work that was never done.9 With respect to one of its contracts, for ex-
ample, Custer Battles used shell companies to falsely charge the CPA for
costs never incurred; in another, Custer Battles was accused of fraudu-
lently receiving payment for "services and facilities ... [that were] never
provided to the CPA." 10
Prior to trial, where the jury found the defendants liable on one of
the two contracts at issue," the Custer Battles court faced two novel le-
gal questions via a summary judgment motion.' 2 First, at the time of Cus-
ter Battles' fraudulent activity, was the CPA, in effect, an American
agency such that the case would even fall within the reach of the FCA?
various U.S. agencies over the last several years, see http://www.taf.org/fcastatistics2006.pdf (last
visited February 19, 2007).
4. The CPA's origins and institutional nature are discussed in Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d
at 620-23. The CPA was "established in Iraq in 2003 to administer and rebuild Iraq during the tran-
sition from the overthrown Hussein regime to the new democratic government of Iraq." Id. at 618.
The earliest public pronouncement of its existence was made by General Tommy R. Franks on April
16, 2003, id. at 620; its existence was reaffirmed by the United Nations, id. at 621; and although it
was "neither created, nor explicitly authorized by Congress," a "substantial majority of the CPA's
operating budget was appropriated by Congress," id. at 622. See also supra note I and infra note 27.
5. Custer Battles 11, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 681.
6. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 619.
7. Custer Battles: About Us, http://www.custerbattles.com/aboutus/index.html (last visited
February 19, 2007).
8. Id.
9. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 619.
10. Id.
11. Custer Battles II, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 679.
12. The court decided to have separate trials for the two main contracts at issue. See id. at 679
n.2. The court has recently granted Custer Battles' motion for summary judgment to dismiss relators'
claims with respect to the second trial, involving the "BIAP" contract. U.S. ex rel. DRC, Inc. v.
Custer Battles, 2007 WL 316839 (E.D. Va. 2007). See Dana Hedgpeth, Judge Clears Contractor of
Fraud in Iraq, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2007, at DI.
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Second, even if the CPA were subject to the FCA, must the funds used
by the CPA to pay contractors have their origin specifically from the
American public fisc for the FCA to apply? This Note focuses on the
court's answer to the second question: FCA liability is limited to those
circumstances in which the U.S. government itself, as distinct from the
CPA, acquired or otherwise held "title" to the funds that the CPA subse-
quently used to tender payment. 13
In applying that holding, the Custer Battles court first untangled
and explained the various sources of funding the CPA had available to
pay contractors in Iraq, not all of which were American in origin. 14 Next,
the court analyzed each particular source of funds the CPA actually used
to pay Custer Battles for the two security contracts at issue. 15 The court
found that two sources of funding used by the CPA to pay Custer Battles
came from the U.S. Treasury, while one source's title belonged to the
"Iraqi people."' 16 In limiting liability for fraud under the FCA to only
those sources of funding to which the United States could be said to have
title, the Custer Battles court relied on precedent that defined "claim"
under the FCA as necessarily a drain on the public fisc.17 Thus, the court
limited potential liability for any alleged fraud only to the two sources of
funds used by the CPA to pay Custer Battles' contracts in which the
United States had actually held title. That decision left untouchable
roughly $9 million of the $12 million total funds fraudulently received
by Custer Battles, as well as any attendant damages available under the
FCA to the government or qui tam plaintiff, because the CPA had sub-
stantially used "Iraqi" funds to pay Custer Battles.18
This Note will explore both the reasoning and ramifications of the
court's opinion to base liability under the FCA solely on a traditionally-
defined ownership interest of the U.S. government. The court used a
formalistic interpretation of precedent to define what represents a claim
under the FCA that developed in cases with highly dissimilar factual
13. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 641.
14. Id. at 623-27.
15. Id. at 630-32. The first of the two contracts "was for the provision of security, housing, and
related facilities and services at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP)." The second contract
"was for security, construction, and operational services to support the Iraqi Currency Exchange
(ICE), which was charged with the creation of a new Iraqi currency." This Note will utilize the
court's acronyms for the two contracts.
16. Id. at 641-46.
17. Id. at 636-37 (citing Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785
(4th Cir. 1999)).
18. Id. at 646. For a brief description of the damages available under the FCA for plaintiffs in
qui tam actions, see infra note 28.
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scenarios to the facts and context of the Custer Battles case. 19 The court's
reliance on case law that defines "claim" under the FCA does not trans-
late well within the context of post-invasion Iraq, and the court did not
acknowledge the reality on the ground when it constrained the meaning
of "claim," and thereby unfortunately limited the reach of the FCA.2 °
In this unusual case, the court should have looked beyond judicial
interpretations of the statutory claim developed from factually dissimilar
cases and instead contemplated the policies behind the qui tam provi-
sions of the FCA. The court should have also acknowledged the implica-
tions of privatization in the realm of federal agencies and the consequent
need for legal accountability in the government's use of private contrac-
tors-especially under the chaotic circumstances in Iraq in which gov-
ernment oversight of private contractors is particularly difficult.21 If the
Custer Battles court had considered these factors, it would have more
broadly interpreted the meaning of "claim" under the FCA, and this
broader definition in turn would have facilitated a greater liability for
contractors' fraudulent actions in Iraq.
The effect of the court's reasoning is to attach FCA liability in these
circumstances only on the pure chance that the CPA happened to use
specifically American funds to pay a fraudulent actor, regardless of the
CPA's broad possessory discretion to simultaneously and freely spend
so-called Iraqi funds.22 The court's approach ignores the reality that Cus-
ter Battles' fraudulent activity substantially harmed American military
and political objectives in Iraq.23 Further, the court's holding undercuts
some policy justifications put forward by proponents of privatization be-
cause a central justification for the government's delegation of power to
private entities assumes a final accountability by government officials for
all forms of government-sponsored action, whether actually performed
by public or private entities. 24 If the court had applied a broader interpre-
tation, then perhaps other legitimate American interests (for example,
19. See United States v. Cohn, 270 U.S. 339 (1926); United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595
(1958); United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228 (1968); see infra Part IV.
20. See Custer Battles II, 444 F. Supp. 2d 678, 686-89 (E.D. Va. 2006) (discussing the nature
of the CPA).
21. See infra note 44.
22. The CPA had differing levels of discretion in how a particular type of funding would be
spent. The level of discretion was based on the source of that funding. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp.
2d at 629; see infra Part IIl. "Iraqi" funds would be disbursed at the "discretion of the [CPA]." Cus-
ter Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 621 (citing U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003)).
23. Cf Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785 (4th Cir. 1999)
(holding, inter alia, that the contractor's "underlying fraudulent activity" is not the focus of the FCA,
unless it relates to a "claim" on government property).
24. See Dan Guttman, Governance by Contract: Constitutional Visions; Time for Reflection
and Choice, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 321, 324 (2004).
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government accountability for the actions of private contractors) would
allow the FCA to be used to prevent waste and fraud.
In order to provide context for the Custer Battles court's opinion,
Part II of this Note generally describes the FCA and the policies behind
its qui tam provision, discusses policy rationales behind the use of pri-
vate security contractors by the U.S. government, and highlights how
security contractors like Custer Battles fit into that picture within the re-
ality of present-day Iraq. Part III examines the reasoning of the Custer
Battles court, and Part IV critiques that reasoning and the application of
precedent in this case. Part V proposes an alternative to the court's rea-
soning which more closely aligns with the interests of the American tax-
payer in preventing and punishing fraud. Finally, Part VI looks beyond
the specifics of this case and briefly suggests congressional approaches
to affirm and fortify the reach of the FCA to all activities performed by
security contractors in war zones under American control.
II. Qui TAM PROVISIONS UNDER THE FCA
& PRIVATIZATION IN THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
The limited scope of this Note does not allow for a full exposition
of the development of the various policies and rationales for the use of
private contractors by the U.S. Armed Forces. However, to give some
context to the Custer Battles opinion, this Part will first outline the de-
velopment of the qui tam provision of the FCA. Next, this Part will
briefly describe some rationales for "privatization," 25 and how those ra-
tionales perhaps ring hollow in the context of foreign U.S. military occu-
pations, as is the case in Iraq. Finally, this Part will conclude with a de-
scription of how some security contractors like Custer Battles actually
operated during the period in which the CPA retained sovereignty26 over
Iraq.
A. The Qui Tam Provision of the False Claims Act
Qui tam actions allow an individual or private entity, called a rela-
tor, to sue on behalf of the U.S. government in order to help deter fraud
perpetrated against the government. 27 Generally, relators provide
25. "Privatization" as a descriptive term has many usages and connotations; however, for the
sake of simplicity, the leading legal definition will suffice: "[t]he act or process of converting a
business or industry from governmental ownership or control to private enterprise." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1214-15 (7th ed. 1999).
26. The CPA transferred sovereignty to Iraq on June 28, 2004. Dexter Filkins, Transition in
Iraq: The Turnover; U.S. Transfers Power to Iraq 2 Days Early, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2004, at Al.
27. A relator is defined as "[t]he real party in interest in whose name a state or an attorney
general brings a lawsuit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1292 (7th ed. 1999). See also 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(b) (2000). This designation explains why the Latin phrase "ex relatione" (abbreviated "ex
Seattle University Law Review
information to the government without which a contractor's fraudulent
claim might not have been detected or successfully prosecuted. Under
the FCA, treble damages 28 are available from a contractor who is found
to have defrauded the government, and the government and the relator
each share in a percentage of those damages. 29 Thus, relators function as
private attorneys general, in that they help civilly prosecute fraudulent
activity which the Justice Department may not have the information or
resources to combat. 30 In the Custer Battles case, relators included both
separate contractors working with the company and a former employee
of Custer Battles. 31
Qui tam actions have a long common law history, stretching back to
the thirteenth century.32 American use of these actions even precedes the
Constitution.33 Congress codified qui tam actions when it passed the
1863 False Claims Act, which was enacted because the large defense
budgets of the Union Army "provided fertile ground for those who
would defraud the government. 34 The Union's war effort did not allow
for full-fledged prosecution against "widespread fraud" during the Civil
War, thus leading Congress to rely on private relators to combat the
problem by giving them half of any damages recovered.35
During World War II, Congress raised the jurisdictional bar for qui
tam actions. Immediately preceding this congressional revision of the
FCA, the Supreme Court had generously interpreted the language of the
1863 Act to allow so called "parasitic" relators to proceed with qui tam
actions even when they had simply copied information from criminal
rel." in citation), meaning "by or on the relation of," is utilized in qui tam actions. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 603 (7th ed. 1999).
28. Treble damages in this instance means a defendant is liable for up to three times the
amount of the damages sustained by the U.S. government as a result of the fraudulent claim. See 31
U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000) (the fraudulent defendant is liable for a civil penalty as well and the "costs
of a civil action brought to recover any such penalty or damages.").
29. Id. § 3730(b), (c) & (d).
30. Id. The U.S. Justice Department has many options when a qui tam action is filed: it can
intervene and take a leading or supporting role in the action; it can let the relator handle the action;
or it can move to dismiss the action entirely. The relator's entitlement to a certain percentage of any
damages awarded depends on the level of involvement of the U.S. government in litigating the ac-
tion. See John C. Ruhnka and Edward J. Gac, The "New" False Claims Act, CPA J. ONLINE (1998),
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajoumal/1998/0498/Features/F400498.htm.
31. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 619.
32. Dan L. Hargrove, Soldiers of Qui Tam Fortune: Do Military Service Members Have Stand-
ing to File Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act?, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 45, 51 (2004); see
also Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774-78 (2000) (dis-
cussing the development ofqui tam actions).
33. Hargrove, supra note 32, at 52.
34. Id. at 53.
35. Id. at 54.
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indictments. 36 In response, Congress passed a revision of the qui tam
provision of the FCA that allowed qui tam actions only when an "honest"
relator brought information not already in the government's possession at
the time of the suit. 3
7
The effect of this amendment made qui tam actions extremely diffi-
cult to pursue. 38 For example, some relators who had passed along in-
formation to the government, but were then beaten to the courthouse by
the Justice Department, were not allowed to bring qui tam actions.39 In
1986, in the face of mounting evidence of fraud by government contrac-
tors, Congress decided to again retool the FCA: Congress specified that
federal courts should allow any person to file a qui tam suit who had
been an "original source" of the information, regardless of whether that
information became public knowledge before the suit was filed.40 This
1986 version of the FCA qui tam provision is the present controlling
statutory language that the Custer Battles court analyzed.
The statutory history of the FCA's qui tam provision reflects a see-
saw in policy concerns and congressional objectives. On the one hand,
the government has always had an interest in preventing fraud by con-
tractors, particularly in the area of defense spending, and in utilizing pri-
vate individuals in order to accomplish that purpose.4' Qui tam actions
can provide a strong financial incentive for individuals with information
of fraudulent activity to come forward. On the other hand, federal agen-
cies like the Department of Defense (DoD), which have grown to rely on
private contractors, appear to retain at least an historic suspicion of rela-
tors, and many federal agencies offer to contractors the ability to submit
to "voluntary internal audit and compliance programs" as perhaps an
36. See Major Deborah L. Collins, The Qui Tam Relator: A Modern Day Goldilocks Searching
For The Just Right Circuit, 2001-JUN Army Law. 1, 4. Collins notes the following:
Opportunists also came in the form of qui tam relators. The original 1863 FCA qui tam
provisions did not restrict the sources from which a relator could obtain his information.
This allowed would-be relators to use public documents as the basis of their successful
suits. This type of suit became known as a "parasitic" suit.
Id See also United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943) (holding that a litigator's
expense in bringing the action was enough to justify "parasitic" actions under the statutory language
of the 1863 version of the FCA, even though the relator had in no way helped to uncover the fraudu-
lent activity itself).
37. Hargrove, supra note 32, at 58-59 (citing United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729
F.2d 1100, 1104-05 (7th Cir. 1984)).
38. Id. at 60.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 61. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006).
41. Hargrove, supra note 32, at 55 ("The 1863 Act and its legislative history emphasized mili-
tary procurement fraud." (citing Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000))).
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alternative means of governmental oversight.42 These agencies may see
relators more often than not as merely opportunistic competitors: if con-
tractors are too easily forced to defend unwarranted lawsuits because of a
"broad" interpretation of the qui tam provision in the FCA, contractors
may be less likely to work with the government, which could serve to
chill creative and efficient43 private sector contributions to the efforts and
operations of the DoD.4 Thus, the challenge for Congress and the federal
courts is to find the proper balance between these two competing
perspectives on the nature of relators and the reach of the FCA.
B. Privatization and the Defense Department
A thorough examination of privatization within the DoD is simply
beyond the scope of this Note. However, in order to provide more con-
text for the Custer Battles decision, it is necessary to provide a simple
sketch of how privatization relies on a theoretical justification of ac-
countability. In the present case, by limiting accountability to a very
formal ownership interest, the Custer Battles court effectively ignored
other U.S. interests that, within the context of foreign military contracts,
should fall within the ambit of the qui tam provision of the FCA. The
following provides background on one of those governmental interests-
accountability for the performance of private contractors in the govern-
ment's employ.
42. See Ruhnka & Gac, supra note 30. The authors note the following:
Over the past 20 years, from about the time of the Federal Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
of 1977, increasing numbers of Federal regulatory, contracting, and enforcement agencies
have made a policy decision to encourage voluntary corporate compliance programs that
can supplement, or in some cases even replace, intrusive and inflexible agency monitor-
ing, inspection, and reporting requirements for regulated industries .... [T]he DOD Vol-
untary Disclosure Program for defense contractors, jointly administered by the Depart-
ments of Defense and Justice... recommends that all defense contractors adopt 'a policy
of voluntary disclosure as a central part of your corporate integrity program' and suggests
that 'early voluntary disclosure, coupled with full cooperation and complete access to
necessary records, are strong indications of an attitude of contractor integrity even in the
wake of potential criminal liability.' Once a contractor is admitted into the DOD pro-
gram, it can expect its eventual liability from self-reported irregularities will be less than
FCA-mandated treble damages.
Id.
43. And "necessary." Private contractors have been an integral part of the logistical and recon-
structive efforts of the American military in Iraq. See Frontline: Private Warriors (PBS television
broadcast June 21, 2005), streaming video available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/warriors/view/.
44. For an informative overview of the DoD's recent use of private contractors and attendant
problems, see U.S. GOVT. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-145, MILITARY OPERATIONS: HIGH
LEVEL DOD ACTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS LONGSTANDING PROBLEMS WITH MANAGEMENT AND
OVERSIGHT OF CONTRACTORS SUPPORTING DEPLOYED FORCES (2006), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07145.pdf.
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An important rationale for the use of private contractors like Custer
Battles by the U.S. government is that public purposes are best per-
formed by a joint effort of government and private entities.45 During the
Cold War, and the accompanying expansion by the United States of the"military-industrial complex, ' 'A6 government reformers looked to the pri-
vate sector for creativity, technical expertise, and new models of man-
agement. 47 The growing reliance on private contractors was seen by these
reformers as justified because of the public sector's apparently inherent
bureaucratic inertia.48 Also, reformers perceived that a more robust pri-
vate sector influence in public affairs would provide a way to counter-
balance the unheralded growth in the scope of the federal government by
creating a "diffusion of sovereignty.
'A 9
The present-day basis for this rationale, however, relies principally
on two premises, one of which is apparently "political," or practical, and
the other which is based in actual administrative policy. The first premise
relies on the notion that citizens simultaneously desire a "small" gov-
ernment, but also do not want an actual reduction in government ser-
vices, so a mixture of the public and private sectors allows the citizenry
to conceive of itself as in effect having its cake and eating it too. 50 The
second, more theoretical and policy-based premise is an assumption that
no matter the size or scope of the private sector's performance of gov-
ernment functions, official government actors demand and enforce actual
accountability from contractors that ensures honest and verifiable con-
tract performance. 51 This premise, however, no longer appears justified
because there is growing "evidence that the official workforce no longer
can be presumed to possess the capacity to account for the Government's
45. Guttman, supra note 24, at 326-31.
46. See Dwight D. Eisenhower, U.S. President, Farewell Address (Jan. 17, 1961), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/speeches/eisenhower001 .htm.
47. Guttman, supra note 24, at 324.
48. Id. at 326.
49. See id. at 326-27. According to Guttman, some contemporary analysts viewed the mix of
public and private interests as a reconstitution of Government. Post-war contracting provided a "new
form of federalism" which would "provide both technical expertise and powerful political support
for increased federal commitment to national defense and public welfare tasks." However, adminis-
trative reformers were aware of the constitutional implications of "blurring the boundaries between
public and private" administration and therefore, as was made clear in a 1962 Cabinet report to
President Kennedy, it was "axiomatic" that government officials must have the ability and compe-
tence to account for all government work. Reformers were also concerned that competent, skilled
federal officials would be enticed into the private sector by higher pay and benefits. See id. at 327
n.13.
50. Id. at 329-30. "Citizens [in the 1980s and 1990s] ... generally wanted small Government
without diminution in governmental functions. To address this inconsistency, new strategies for the
reform took hold at home and abroad under banners touting 'reinventing government,' 'public-
private partnerships,' 'devolution,' 'privatization,' and 'deregulation."' Id.
51. Id. at 324.
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operations. 5 2 Since the reality of the presumption that officials hold pri-
vate industry accountable for their actions appears empirically suspect,
the problems of unaccountability vis-d-vis private contract procurement
and oversight by the DoD itself would logically be compounded within
the context of a foreign theatre of war, with its attendant uncertainty and
danger. This apparent lack of ability by federal officials 53 to adequately
maintain accurate and adequate control or oversight of private contrac-
tors suggests, among other things, a greater need for a broadly inter-
preted qui tam provision of the FCA in order to better prevent fraud, and
thereby provide a tool to force contractors to act responsibly when they
perform government contracts.
Yet over the past few decades, Congress has consistently demanded"personnel ceilings" for federal agencies. 54 These personnel ceilings limit
the number of jobs available under the government payroll.55 In effect,
these ceilings require a large private sector involvement in public func-
tions.56 Therefore, if Congress's intent with respect to personnel ceilings
affirms a more general approval or acceptance of the benefits of privati-
zation and the status quo, it follows that Congress may not have an over-
riding interest in legislation that would increase agency accountability at
the risk of jeopardizing those benefits.57 Although this may mean that
Congress has delegated the responsibility of oversight and accounting to
52. Id. at 323, 330-31. Guttman notes the following:
In December 2002, Comptroller General David Walker conceded that he was "not confi-
dent that agencies have the ability to effectively manage cost, quality and performance in
contracts." The [General Accounting Office's] high-risk list includes contracting at the
Department of Defense .... In announcing her departure in September 2003, Office of
Federal Procurement Policy Administrator Angela Styles expressed a similar sentiment:
"There is still not a lot of oversight in some areas of our contracting system, and I think it
will haunt us." . . . . Continued indicia of oversight deficiencies are easily discovered
within agencies performing the Government's most sensitive work.
Id. See also Memorandum from Thomas E. White, Sec'y of the Army, to the Under Secretaries of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, Comptroller/CFO, and Personnel & Readiness
(Mar. 8, 2002), available at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0402/042502white.pdf (noting that,
as summarized by Guttman, "Army planners and programmers lack visibility at the Departmental
level into the labor and costs associated with the contract work force and of the organizations and
missions supported by them.").
53. See Private Warriors, supra note 43 (interview by Martin Smith with Gen. Paul Kern
(Ret.), Army Material Command). See also Erik Eckholm, Reach of War: Procurement; Army Con-
tract Official Critical ofHalliburton Pact is Demoted, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2005, at A9.
54. Guttman, supra note 24, at 323, 326.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See 60 Minutes: War Profiteers? (CBS television broadcast Feb. 12, 2006) (interview by
Steve Kroft with Senator Byron Dorgan, suggesting that the present Administration and the 109th
Congress had "no interest in aggressive oversight" of private contractors). For an informative per-
spective on the role of private security contractors in Iraq, and their functional integration with the
U.S. military in that environment, see Private Warriors, supra note 43.
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executive branch employees, it may also signal that Congress relies on
private attorneys general to play a crucial role in holding contractors ac-
countable for any fraudulent activities. If so, a broadly construed FCA
would be in keeping with congressional understandings.
C. Security Contractors in Iraq
So how do security contractors like Custer Battles fit into this pic-
ture? There may be legitimate arguments about the private sector's ad-
vantageous ability for innovation, especially with regard to its techno-
logical expertise, when discussing government contracts with weapons
manufacturers or other components producers. 58 However, that particular
argument as applied to the security industry is misplaced because it is
difficult to imagine how private companies such as Custer Battles could
provide more innovative protection of vital interests than the U.S. mili-
tary itself.
Whether legitimate in theory or not, security contractors have been
extensively used by the DoD in Iraq.59 One political advantage they may
provide is that they lessen the need for actual military manpower. 6° The
use of private security thus, theoretically, lessens the direct impact of
conflict on American soldiers, as well as policymakers, because casual-
ties and organizational costs are absorbed by nonmilitary entities. A re-
lated assumption validating the use of private security contractors is that
it is more cost-effective for the DoD, or the CPA, to contract out certain
security functions in order to allow the military to more flexibly focus on
whatever instant, or more severe, conflicts or crises may arise.6'
On the other hand, a security contractor may have so much discre-
tion in how they perform the contract that the actual performance itself,
even if done in good faith, may undercut some of the broader goals of the
military. For example, Custer Battles has been accused by former em-
ployees of hiring and arming young Kurds (who have "historical resent-
ments against other Iraqis"), as security guards.62 According to some
former American soldiers-turned-employees of Custer Battles, these
Kurdish guards "brutalized" Iraqi civilians by firing into cars to appar-
ently alleviate a traffic jam, and otherwise "terrorizing" civilians by
58. Cf Guttman, supra note 24, at 326.
59. See Private Warriors, supra note 43.
60. See id. (interview by Martin Smith with Andy Melville, Erinys Security).
61. See id. (interview by Martin Smith with Col. John A. Toolan, USMC, discussing how the
loss of four private security contactors, who worked for "Blackwater, U.S.A," disrupted the mili-
tary's policy vis-A-vis the local population in Fallujah). See also James Dao et al., The Struggle for
Iraq: Security; Private Guards Take Big Risks, For Right Price, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2004, at A 1.
62. Lisa Myers and the NBC Investigative Unit, U.S. Contractors in Iraq Allege Abuses,
MSNBC, Feb. 17, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6947745/.
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smashing into and shooting up other cars.63 Given the centuries-old rival-
ries among ethnic groups in the region, this behavior would seem to lend
momentum to an insurgency. Thus, the performance of a government
contract64 by an American security contractor that does not take account
of fairly sensitive cultural realities may have deleterious effects on the
United States' primary goal of ending the insurgency in Iraq. In essence,
the possible rationales of cost-effectiveness and flexibility presumably
provided by security contractors in Iraq may be seriously questioned if
the actual performance of these contractors helps to fan the flames of
violence.65
On a broad scale, and based on some of the problems attendant with
the use of security contractors in Iraq in situations similar to that in Cus-
66ter Battles, courts should broadly define what fraudulent activities are
actionable under the FCA. A broadly construed qui tam provision not
only accomplishes the general anti-fraud purposes of the FCA, but is es-
pecially welcome in situations like present-day Iraq where the govern-
ment's ability to supervise or even control contractors is substantially
63. Id. A "trophy" video, supposedly made by ex-employees of a British security firm called
Aegis, shows precisely this type of behavior. See Sean Rayment, "Trophy" Video Exposes Private
Security Contractors Shooting Up Iraqi Drivers, Nov. 26, 2005, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/l l1/27/wirq27.xml&sSheet-/news/20
05/11/27/ixworld.html.
64. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d 617, 630 (E.D. Va. 2005). "Although the two contracts at
issue here were both signed on standard U.S. contracting forms, the government concedes that in
contrast with typical U.S. military contracts, contracts obligating Vested, Seized, or DFI Funds were
not subject to U.S. contracting procedures, whether statutory or regulatory." Id.
65. See Private Warriors, supra note 43 (interview by Martin Smith with P.W. Singer of the
Brookings Institute, suggesting that the difficulty of unforeseen circumstances in Iraq often leads
private contractors, or their employees, to break their contractual obligations, and that that kind of
"flexibility" undercuts the military effort); (interview by Martin Smith with Prof. Steven Schooner,
George Washington Univ., pointing to the lack of legal accountability for "cowboy"-type behavior
by security contractors in Iraq, and the resulting implications for that lack of accountability on the
perceptions of Iraqis); (interview by Martin Smith with Lawrence Peter, Private Security Association
(Iraq), Spokesman, conceding the lack of any public accountability or transparency regarding mili-
tary "reprimands" to security contractors in Iraq).
66. 376 F. Supp. 2d at 619. See also Amended Complaint, United States ex rel DRC, Inc. v.
Custer Battles, No. CV-04-199-A, 2004 WL 3270664 (E.D. Va. 2005). See also 60 Minutes: War
Profiteers? (CBS television broadcast Feb. 12, 2006) (interview by Steve Kroft with Frank Willis,
CPA, Ministry of Transportation (discussing a $2 million cash payment to Custer Battles and how
the CPA accounting system in place at the time of the Custer Battles contracts was "non-existent");
(interview by Steve Kroft with British colonel Philip Wilkinson, CPA, Ministry of Finance, discuss-
ing the poor "performance" of Custer Battles with respect to its obligations under the ICE contract
and suggesting the only way they could have gotten away with their blatant "breach" was because of
"high political top cover"); (interview by Steve Kroft with Col. Richard Ballard, former Chief of
Security at the Baghdad International Airport, recalling how Custer Battles was contractually obli-
gated under the BIAP contract "to provide sophisticated X-ray equipment" for which they received a
cash advance yet never procured). According to the 60 Minutes report, Custer Battles has neverthe-
less received over $100 million in government contracts. Id.
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hampered by pervasive violence. Some deterrent to fraudulent behavior
on the part of security contractors is better than none at all. Courts should
allow relators, through the apparatus of a broadly applied qui tam provi-
sion of the FCA, to help officials detect and prevent the development of
an atmosphere of "anything goes" in terms of accountability for contract
performance. Prevention of fraud will more likely be accomplished if
courts allow qui tam actions based on fraudulent activity within a war
zone to move forward if the government functionally possesses or con-
trols the funds used to pay the false claim. Because the uncertainty and
danger of a war zone already presents challenges to an effective govern-
mental oversight of contract performance, like the situation existing in
Custer Battles, a narrowly construed qui tam provision would seem to
compound those problems.
To summarize, given the specific purposes and history of the FCA,
as well as the difficulties of effective oversight by public officials over
private contractors generally and especially in the challenging circum-
stances of present-day Iraq, courts should favor an interpretation of the
FCA that better furthers accountability and oversight of fraudulent
actors.
III. THE CUSTER BATTLES MEMO OPINION
As Part II suggests, a broad application by federal courts of the qui
tam provision of the FCA may seem warranted in circumstances like
those in present-day Iraq. First, the context of an active, hostile war zone
environment reasonably implies that the formalities of government stan-
dard accounting procedures with respect to contractor oversight might
not be completely adequate. 67 This situation creates an incentive for un-
scrupulous contractors to engage in fraud, and leads to a consequent need
for a broadly-read qui tam provision.68 Second, unlike typical FCA cases,
a fraud perpetrated on the CPA or similar constituted entities, even if
technically non-American ownership interests are involved, could none-
theless hinder American military and political interests. A more broadly
applied qui tam provision, at least in these circumstances, would help
deter actions by contractors that undercut the general aims of reconstruc-
tion. The Custer Battles court, however, applied a strained interpretation
of precedent to reach an unfortunately narrow construction of the mean-
ing and reach of the FCA. That narrow construction would leave
67. See Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 619. See also Erik Eckholm, supra note 53, at A9
(describing the allegedly politically-motivated demotion of Bunnatine H. Greenhouse, chief overseer
of contracts at the Army Corps of Engineers, for her criticism of "a large, noncompetitive contract
with the Halliburton Company for work in Iraq").
68. 31 U.S.C. § 3729-3812 (2000).
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untouchable nine million dollars received by Custer Battles for work that
was never done.69
In this Part, the Custer Battles memo opinion will be analyzed in
two sections. In the first section, the procedural stance and factual con-
text of the Motion for Summary Judgment will be briefly discussed. The
second section will describe the court's conclusions regarding what con-
stitutes a claim under the FCA in these circumstances, and the applica-
tion of that holding to the facts.
A. Background
The qui tam action in Custer Battles centered around two contracts
awarded to Custer Battles by the CPA. 70 The first, designated "BIAP" by
the court and awarded within weeks of the formation of the CPA,7' in-
volved "security, housing and related facilities and services at the Bagh-
dad International Airport. 72 The second contract, designated "ICE" by
the court, involved "security, construction, and operational services to
support the Iraqi Currency Exchange (ICE), which was charged with the
creation of a new Iraqi currency to replace the 'old' Iraqi dinars (bearing
the face of Saddam Hussein) with 'new' Iraqi dinars. 73
As previously mentioned, one of the two relators in the case is a
former employee of Custer Battles; the other relator is a subcontractor
who worked alongside Custer Battles.74 The relators showed that, with
respect to the ICE contract, Custer Battles formed shell company sub-
sidiaries in the Cayman Islands, and included false invoices from those
subsidiaries when they presented their "cost-plus" contract 75 claims to
69. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 647.
70. Id. at 619.
71. Id. at 629 n.39. See also 60 Minutes, supra note 57. According to the 60 Minutes report,
Custer Battles was to provide "security" for the civilian activities at the Baghdad Intemational Air-
port; however, that activity never got underway due to the deteriorating security situation in Iraq
during the early months of the invasion, and thereafter Custer Battles provided more of a "gate-
keeping" security function at the airport. Id. Also, according to "a memo obtained by 60 Minutes,"
the "Airport Director of Security" told the CPA that Custer Battles' performance suggested that they
were "war profiteers." Id.
72. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 619.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. A "cost-plus" contract is a "contract in which payment is based on a fixed fee or a percent-
age added to the actual cost incurred." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 344 (8th ed. 2004). See
Amended Complaint at 7 T 44, United States ex rel DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, No. CV-04-199-A,
2004 WL 3270664 (E.D. Va. 2005). See also Joseph Neff and Jay Price, Iraq: Security Contractors
in Iraq Pumping Up Costs, RALEIGH-DURHAM NEWS & OBSERVER, Oct. 24, 2004, available at
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id= 11607 (generally describing the controversies behind the
military's use of "cost-plus" contracts in Iraq, especially with respect to Blackwater, U.S.A.).
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the CPA.7 6 The relators pointed to many acts of over-billing and rather
blatant acts of deception by Custer Battles in the performance of the ICE
contract, such as painting over used equipment and claiming it to be pur-
chased as new under the government contracts and then subsequently
billing the government for the expense.77 The jury also found that at a
meeting between U.S. officials and Custer Battles, a Custer Battles rep-
resentative accidentally left behind documents detailing the amounts that
Custer Battles had overcharged the government. This turn of events led
to a moratorium on the awarding of federal contracts to Custer Battles.79
B. Summary Judgment Motion
Aside from disputing the factual allegations of the qui tam action,
Custer Battles asserted two main legal defenses against the relators'
claims.80 Custer Battles first defense was that the CPA was not a legiti-
mate U.S. government agency and that any fraud drawing upon the
CPA's funds were off-limits to qui tam actions under the FCA. l The
company's second defense was a claim that the funds available to the
CPA were to be used only "for the Iraqi people," 82 and were therefore
76. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 619. See also 60 Minutes, supra note 57 (interview by
Steve Kroft with Robert lsakson, one of the relators of the present case, describing how Custer Bat-
tles approached him two weeks prior to the alleged fraudulent activity and told Mr. Isakson of their
plans for "defrauding the United States government.").
77. Amended Complaint at 10 70-73, United States ex rel DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, No.
CV-04-199-A, 2004 WL 3270664 (E.D. Va. 2005).
78. Custer Battles II, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 681. See also Staff of H. Minority Comm. On Gov-
ernment Reform, 109th Cong., Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Mismanagement of Iraqi Funds, at 15-16
(Comm. Print 2005) [hereinafter Minority Report] (quoting statement of Alan Grayson, An Over-
sight Hearing on Waste, Fraud and Abuse in U.S. Government Contracting in Iraq, Senate Democ-
ratic Policy Committee (Feb. 14, 2005)), available at http://oversight.house.gov/Documents/
20050621114229-22109.pdf
79. Minority Report, supra note 78 (citing Dept. of the Air Force, Memorandum in Support of
the Suspensions of Custer Battles, LLC et al. (Sep. 20, 2004)). See 60 Minutes, supra note 57. Ac-
cording to 60 Minutes, this moratorium on the awarding of federal contracts to Custer Battles has
expired. Id.
80. Custer Battles also challenged the FCA claim under a clause of the statute that makes "pre-
sentment" to an officer of the U.S. necessary. They argued, in light of the fact that the CPA was the
contracting agent in this case, that no presentment to an actual U.S. official had taken place. The
court put the issue to the side for later disposition. See Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 633, 647-
49. After the jury found Custer Battles liable, the court agreed with Custer Battles on this point, and
held that no "presentment" within the meaning of the FCA had taken place. Custer Battles II, 444 F.
Supp. 2d at 683-86.
81. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 633. See Custer Battles II, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 678 (hold-
ing that the claims in the case of the ICE contract were not presented to an American government
employee in official capacity, as required by 31 U.S.C. § 3129(a)(1) (2000)).
82. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 624 n.21 (citing Coalition Provisional Authority, Memo-
randum No. 4, Contract and Grant Procedures Applicable to Vesterd [sic] and Seized Iraqi Property
and the Development Fund for Iraq 1 (Aug. 19, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.
org/regulations).
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merely in the possession of the United States (while technically owned
by Iraq); thus, American courts would not have jurisdiction under the
FCA over false claims paid with so-called Iraqi fundsY
1. What Constitutes a Claim Under the FCA? 84
The court noted judicial precedent that suggested the meaning of"claim" under the FCA should be limited and should not be read as ad-
dressing any and all "underlying fraudulent activity" perpetrated on the
government.85 However, the court also acknowledged that subsequent to
the development of this precedent, Congress expanded the meaning of"claim" via the 1986 amendments to the FCA by codifying the defini-
86tion. According to statute, a claim under the FCA is "any request or
demand ... for money or property which is made to a contractor ... if
the [United States] provides any portion of the money or property... or
if the [United States] will reimburse such contractor ... for any portion
of the money or property which is requested or demanded., 87
Despite the 1986 congressional amendment to the FCA, the court
determined that due to the unusual circumstances of this particular qui
tam action, the statutory definition of claim must be read in light of pre-
vious judicial precedent defining it.8 8 The court reached this conclusion
by noting that the term "provides" in the statutory definition of "claim"
could be read broadly to include "any demand that causes the govern-
ment to [merely] disburse resources within its legal possession," or it
could be read narrowly, such that "provides," when read in conjunction
with "reimburse," would suggest that the money claimed by the contrac-
tor must be "the government's money." 89 According to the court, because
the statutory language alone did not preclude either interpretation the
"judicially well-defined" understanding of 'claim' that had developed
prior to 1986 would dictate the outcome. 90
In short, the court's examination of the prior case history led it to
determine that a claim under the FCA must draw on the U.S. "public
fisc," and as such, must actually be U.S. government property. In other
words, the court determined that the U.S. government must have legal
83. Id. at 638 n.61.
84. This question will be explored much further in Part IV. This part of the Note will simply
chronicle the court's approach.
85. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 635 (citing Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River
Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785 (4th Cir. 1999)).
86. Id. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (2000).
87. Id.
88. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 636.
89. Id. at 636 (emphasis added).
90. Id.
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title to the funds used to pay an allegedly fraudulent contractor for the
FCA to apply.9' The court stated, "it is the ownership of each of [the
various types of funding used to pay Custer Battles] that is ultimately
relevant to the FCA analysis, not the use to which the owner put the
funds., 92 As a result, the court proceeded to scrutinize each source of
funding that the CPA had actually used to pay Custer Battles' contracts.
2. Did the United States Have Title to Each
Source of Funds Used to Pay Custer Battles?
The CPA tendered payment to Custer Battles for the BIAP and ICE
contracts from multiple sources of funding. Notably, the CPA used no
funds actually appropriated by Congress to pay the allegedly fraudulent
claims made by Custer Battles.93 However, the CPA used three other
sources of funding to disburse payments to Custer Battles.
The first source of funding came from what are called "Vested
Funds." Vested Funds are comprised of properties frozen by the U.S.
government where the property was within the United States and owned
by "hostile" foreign entities. 94 Under federal law, the President may con-
fiscate these assets when hostile entities attack or are otherwise militarily
engaged with the United States.95 Under the statute granting the President
this power, confiscation vests title to the properties in "any agency or
person the President designates., 96 In 2003, President Bush utilized this
power to confiscate frozen Iraqi assets and vested those assets in the U.S.
Treasury. Most of the $2.1 billion worth of these frozen assets was con-
verted into cash and shipped to Iraq "in the form of shrink-wrapped pal-
lets of U.S. bills. 97
"Seized Funds" made up the second source of funding the CPA
used towards its contractual obligations. These funds were simply "found
and seized by Coalition Forces in Iraq as an occupying force in accor-
dance with the laws and usages of war .... .. The President delegated
authority to seize these assets; 99 they were placed in the custody of the
91. Id. at 636-37.
92. Id. at 624 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 623.
94. Id. at 624.
95. Id.; see 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(c) (2000).
96. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 624.
97. Id. at 625; see also Minority Report, supra note 78, at 10-13.
98. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 626.
99. According to the court, the President, in a memo to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, stated
that these funds should only be used to "assist the Iraqi people and support the reconstruction of
Iraq." Id. at 626 n.29 (citing Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld (Apr. 30, 2003)).
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U.S. Army in Kuwait,' 00 and they consisted of almost $1 billion in cur-
rency as well as various other non-financial items. 10' As the court sug-
gested, the "laws and usages of war" would dictate that title would vest
in the occupying force.'0 2 In light of the President's "delegation," it ap-
pears any title in Seized Funds was claimed by the United States. In Cus-
ter Battles, "the entire $16.8 million BIAP contract price was paid [to
Custer Battles] with Vested and Seized Funds."'0 3
In addition to legally-recognized title of these two sources of fund-
ing having been vested in the United States, the court noted that the DoD
exercised some "involvement and oversight" over the CPA with respect
to the management and accounting of Vested and Seized Funds. 10 4 This
involvement included two principal processes: (1) the DoD 10 5 had to ap-
prove the allocation of "funding authority" as requested by the CPA, and
(2) the U.S. Army actually disbursed these funds to contractors upon
CPA certification. 10 6 In essence, the court seemed to suggest that Vested
and Seized Funds could both legitimately be described as American
funds through the designation of legal title as well as the statutory over-
sight by the DoD and the U.S. Army with respect to management and
accounting.
In contrast, the final source of funding used by the CPA, the Devel-
opment Fund for Iraq (DFI), only required CPA approval for expendi-
ture; no DoD or Office of Management and Budget "oversight" was
involved. 10 7 The DFI "was established through the coordinated effort of
the United Nations and the CPA to fund relief and reconstruction efforts
in Iraq. 10 8 The DFI included, among other things, funds from the U.N.
"Oil for Food" program and revenues from export sales of Iraqi oil. 09 In
addition to differences in the management and accounting of DFI funds,
the court also asserted the DFI's distinction from Vested & Seized Funds
by noting that "while the DFI was administered by the CPA and the
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 647.
104. Id. at 627.
105. Id. at 628. According to the court, "both the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
and the [DoD Comptroller] were required to approve each funding request from Vested or Seized
Funds before the money could be allocated for use by the CPA." Id.
106. Id. at 629. Note the court's specific reference to the U.S. proprietary interest adhering to
the Army's relatively conspicuous involvement with disbursement of Vested and Seized Funds, in
contrast to the third source of funding, the Development Fund for Iraq [DFI], discussed infra.
107. Id. at 645 (under provisions of U.N. Resolution 1483, the CPA "was required to consult
with the 'Iraqi interim administration."').
108. Id. at 626.
109. Id. at 626.
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corpus of the account was held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, it was recorded on the books of the Central Bank of Iraq." '1 10
On a more fundamental level, the court noted several reasons why
the United States did not have title to the DFI funds. First, the court dis-
tinguished DFI funds from the other funds the CPA had used to pay Cus-
ter Battles:
Unlike Vested Funds, funds in the DFI did not vest in the U.S.
Treasury. And unlike Seized Funds, the funds in the DFI could not
be used or wasted to further the interests of the Unites States. In-
stead, all of the funds in the DFI either came directly from Iraqi
sources or became Iraqi funds upon donation to the DFI. 111
The court also pointed out that the founding provisions of the DFI were
contained in a United Nations resolution, which made "clear that, from
its inception, the DFI was Iraqi money, administered for a time by the
CPA, but strictly on behalf of the people of Iraq."' 12 Further, this resolu-
tion directed that, despite the corpus of the DFI being located at the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York, it would be held there as a "state bank
account by the Central Bank of Iraq."" 3 The fund was only to be used for"purposes benefiting [sic] the people of Iraq."'1 14 According to the court:
In sum, a request for payment from the DFI was not a demand for
payment from U.S. government money that caused financial loss to
the federal fisc. Instead, loss of DFI funds as the result of fraud was
damage to the property of the Iraqi people. Accordingly, any de-
mands for payment from the DFI were not "claims" within the
meaning of the FCA. 115
Therefore, because there was no direct economic loss to the U.S. gov-
ernment, and because the court found that claims under the FCA would
only attach to funds to which the United States has title, Custer Battles
was not liable under the FCA for any fraudulent claims which had been
paid from DFI funds. 116 Custer Battles' motion for summary judgment
was partially granted: only false claims, or percentages of false claims,
paid from Vested or Seized Funds would be subject to liability under the
110. Id.
111. Id. at 645.
112. Id. (citing U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1483 14 (May 23, 2003)).
113. Id.
114. Id. On whether the CBI was actually "independent" from the CPA, see Steven H. Hanke,
Dinar Plans, CATO INSTITUTE, July 21, 2003, http://www.cato.org/research/articleshanke-
030721.html; see also Ed Harriman, So Mr. Bremer, where did all the money go?, GUARDIAN
UNLIMITED, July 7, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1522983,00.html.
115. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 646.
116. Id.
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FCA. The bottom line: Custer Battles would not be liable for nearly $9
million of the $12 million ICE contract price because the CPA drew that
portion of the payment from the DFI. 
17
IV. A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE COURT'S REASON[NG
As described in Part III, the Custer Battles court relied on previous
cases to determine that in order to bring a qui tam action under the FCA,
the false claim must have been drawn from sources of funding to which
the United States has formal title. The court's interpretation is reason-
able; however, this Part suggests that the court should have pursued a
path more conscious of the reality on the ground, so to speak. As dis-
cussed below, the court looked only to precedent defining what a claim is
and unconvincingly characterized those prior holdings. As a result, the
court awkwardly applied formal distinctions in a context that demanded a
more flexible interpretation of precedent.
Ultimately, the court's decision allows qui tam defendants a seem-
ingly favorable roll of the dice in circumstances where a government
agency or entity, in tendering payment for its contractual obligations,
merely "administers" ' 18 formally-non-U.S. funds to defense contractors.
As discussed in Part V, the court should have held that a fraudulent claim
that is subject to liability under the FCA may be defined in terms of a
reduction from funds in the possession of the Unites States.
A. Judicial Precedent and the Meaning of "Claim " Under the FCA
The Custer Battles court relied exclusively on a number of cases
that discuss the nature of a false claim for purposes of the FCA. This sec-
tion will discuss the actual holding from each Supreme Court case that
the Custer Battles court relied on to reach its conclusion and then com-
pare each holding to how the Custer Battles court framed each of those
decisions. The policies and interpretations that the Custer Battles court
adopted and based on previous cases bear a tenuous relation to the facts
of the case. However, in order to frame the issue, the statutory language
of the FCA's qui tam provision and the statutory definition of claim must
first be analyzed.
117. Id. at 647.
118. Id. at 646.
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1. The Statutory Language
Both the relators and defendants in Custer Battles mainly focused
their attention on 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1). 119 Under the heading "Liability
for certain acts," that section of the FCA reads:
Any person who ... knowingly presents, or causes to be presented,
to an officer or employee of the United States Government or a
member of the Armed Forces of the United States a false or fraudu-
lent claim for payment or approval ... is liable [for civil penalties
up to $10, 000 and treble damages].
120
The Custer Battles court interpreted the statute as requiring three
elements: "(i) a 'claim' (ii) that is [either] 'knowingly... false or fraudu-
lent,' and (iii) 'presented to an officer or employee of the United States'
for payment or approval., 121 The court noted that the facts which would
determine whether any claim made by Custer Battles met the "false or
fraudulent" element were "vigorously disputed," and the court left reso-
lution of that element for a later proceeding. 122 To determine whether the
"claim" element had been met, the court looked first to the statutory
definition within the FCA. According to the statute, a claim is:
[A]ny request or demand.., for money or property which is made
to a contractor.. . if the United States Government provides any
portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded,
or if the Government will reimburse such contractor ... for any por-
tion of the money requested or demanded.
123
The court began by focusing the meaning of "provides." The rela-
tors had argued that if the United States (through the CPA) "adminis-
tered" funds which were used to pay Custer Battles' BIAP and ICE
contract claims, then regardless of the funds' ownership, the term "pro-
vides" would encompass the CPA's administration of "Iraqi" funds and
FCA liability would attach for any claims drawn from those funds.
12 4
Custer Battles, on the other hand, maintained that "provides" and
119. See id. at 634. The parties also argued over subsections (a)(2) & (a)(3) of this provision,
but the court found that an analysis under (a)(1) was dispositive to the claims before it. Id; see U.S.
ex. rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488 (2004) (holding that § 3729(a)(2) has a "present-
ment" requirement similar to (a)(l), even though the language of (a)(2) does not include the lan-
guage found in (a)(1)). For criticism of the reasoning in Totten, see Mark Labaton, Whistle Stop: A
Split Among Federal Courts Means that Chief Justice Roberts May Have an Opportunity to Revisit
His 2004 Decision Limiting Whistle Blower Suits, 29 L.A. LAW. 25 (2006).
120. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2000).
121. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 634. The court also mentioned a circuit split on whether
there should be a judicially imposed element that the false claim be "material." See id. at 634 n.54.
122. Id. at 635.
123. Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (2000)).
124. Id.
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"reimburse" necessarily implied that the FCA only applies with respect
to the "government's money."'125 As described previously, the court
found that despite the "recent" 1986 statutory amendments defining
claim, 126 both interpretations were plausible because "the term 'provide'
is capacious enough to accommodate both arguments" and "neither is
obviously correct."12 7  As a result, the court looked to the "judicially
well-defined" meaning of claim that had developed prior to the 1986
congressional explanation of its meaning via 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c).12 8
2. Judicial Precedent Defining "Claim"
The Custer Battles court, in its characterization of the holdings of
the three principal cases that it relied on to define the scope of "claim," ' 29
placed great emphasis on the proposition that the precedent of what
claim meant under the FCA had, over the course of judicial development
of that meaning, been restricted to government property; that is, property
in which it could be said that the government had some sort of ownership
interest, even if indirect.13  In contrast, the court distinguished cases
where FCA liability was absent because those cases involved claims
upon a government interest that was clearly only possessory.1 3  The
court's observation of a bright line of mutual exclusivity between owner-
ship and possession as a deciding factor in establishing whether a claim
125. Id.; see also id. at 635 n.55 (the U.S. government suggested in its brief that the definition
of claim should be applied broadly to include "any request for money or property from resources 'in
which [the government] has an interest."').
126. See Pub. L. No. 99-562, §2(7), 100 Stat. 3153 (1986) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c)
(2000)).
127. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 636.
128. Id.; see also id. at 636 n.57 (citing CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc. 373 F.3d 544, 553
(4th Cir. 2004) (holding that when Congress codifies a common law principle, common law remains
a "valuable touchstone" for interpretation of the statute, unless Congress explicitly states that it
intends to supplant common law)).
129. United States v. Neifert-White, 390 U.S. 228 (1968); United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S.
595 (1958); United States v. Cohn, 270 U.S. 339 (1926).
130. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 634-41.
131. Id. The Custer Battles court principally relied on the following lower court cases for the
supposition that precedent established that a claim under the FCA must comprise government-owned
property: United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(holding, inter alia, that the fraudulent claim presented to Amtrak, as merely a federal "grantee" and
not an actual government entity, does not give rise to liability under the FCA because payment
comes from funds already granted to Amtrak and the FCA is limited to instances where "the Gov-
ernment indirectly or directly provides the funds and suffers the loss [hereinafter Totten 11]; Hutchins
v. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, 253 F.3d 176 (3rd Cir. 2001) (finding, in a pro se qui tam action,
that the submission of inflated legal bills for approval by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court did not violate
the FCA, because the government itself was not a creditor in any of the bankruptcy estates); and
Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776 (4th Cir. 1999) (interpreting 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(c) as requiring a claim upon the government fisc for liability to attach (citing to McNinch,
356 U.S. at 595)). See also 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (2003), Notes of Decision 81-130.
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would raise FCA sanctions certainly works, at least in the sense that the
cases cited suggest a pattern.
However, the court's analysis disregarded the gray area in between
ownership and possession that the CPA's freedom of administrative with
the DFI funds would suggest. Of the cases where the government was
found to merely have possession of the property to which a claim was
made, none suggest the level of governmental interest or involvement in
the claimed property present in Custer Battles. Yet the court apparently
felt bound by precedent, and despite the lack of factual parallels, it sup-
ported its own holding by its translation and characterization of the de-
lineating principle supposedly followed in the three major Supreme
Court cases that interpret the definition of "claim" under the FCA. This
section will look more closely at those three cases.
a. United States v. Cohn' 32
Cohn was a 1926 case that arose under an earlier version of the
FCA wherein the Court found that a false claim for cigars in the posses-
sion of U.S. Customs officials was not a claim within the ambit of the
FCA.133 The cigars were actually owned by a third party in the Philip-
pines, but a Chicago businessman knowingly and fraudulently gained
possession of them.134 The false claim for cigars was not a claim against
the government because the relevant provision of the then-controlling
version of the FCA related "solely to the payment or approval of a claim
for money or property to which a right is asserted against the Govern-
ment, based upon the Government's own liability to the claimant."'1 35
Thus, the government could not assert a "right" to the cigars (nor could
the claimant presumably assert a "right" against the government in the
event of its refusal of the fraudulent claim), and a claim under the FCA
would not include merchandise "which is merely in the temporary pos-
session of an agent of the Government for delivery to the person who
may be entitled to its possession.' '136
Realistically, the Cohn holding may only say that a temporary pos-
sessory interest by the government in "property" cannot constitute the
kind of government interest which would be subject to a false claim un-
der the 1926 version of the FCA. In fact, the Court specifically addressed
132. 270 U.S. at 339.
133. The Court relied on the implications resulting from criminal penalties under the FCA
statute at that time, U.S. Penal Code, § 35 (as amended by Act, Oct. 23, 1918, codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 286, 287, 641, 1001, 1022-24, 1361 (2000)).
134. Cohn, 270 U.S. at 343-44. The FCA once had both criminal and civil enforcement reme-
dies, and it is that version of the FCA that the Cohn Court interpreted. See id at 341 n.1.
135. Id. at 345-46.
136. Id. at 346.
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the earlier-FCA statutory provision by concluding that the indictment did
not show any intent on the part of Cohn to defraud the government of its
own property.1 37
The Custer Battles court tried to use Cohn to establish a principle
that would justify its holding, characterizing the decision in an interest-
ing manner:
Thus, the Supreme Court's holding in Cohn may be summarized
this way: a request for resources from the government does not con-
stitute a claim when the government acts only as custodian or bailee
of a third-party's property. Instead, a 'claim' must be a request for
government funds or property, i.e., a 'call on the government
fiSC.'
138
This characterization stretches the holding of Cohn to fit the court's un-
derstanding of later, lower-court precedent that developed with respect to
the meaning of "claim." 139 The court's broad characterization of the
holding as standing for a principle means that the U.S. government must
act as more than a custodian or bailee with respect to "resources" for the
(present) FCA to be applicable. As the court stated, "no case has held...
that the FCA is so broad as to reach not only false claims presented for
government property, but to claims for any property in the government's
possession, even if the government is only a custodian, bailee, or admin-
istrator of the property."'' 40
Whether, in a doctrinal sense, cigars should be the same as "re-
sources" seems dubious, especially when the resources at issue in Custer
Battles go to the heart of a vital U.S. interest-reconstruction of Iraq.
Though the court's application of Cohn may be accurate in a formal
sense, and may fit into the court's limitation on what constitutes a
'claim,' the CPA, with a power to form contracts based substantially on
the possession of approximately $20 billion of DFI funds,141 should not
realistically be considered only a "bailee." "Administrator" certainly
seems a more apt description for the CPA---even assuming a true inde-
pendent ownership of DFI funds by the Central Bank of Iraq or the "Iraqi
people.'1 42 The facts of Cohn do not reasonably compare to the level and
breadth of administration exercised by the CPA as discussed in Custer
Battles. Thus, the court's characterization of Cohn, although technically
137. Id. at 347.
138. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 636-37 (quoting Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah
River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785 (4th Cir. 1999) (emphasis in original)).
139. See supra note 131.
140. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d. at 636 (second emphasis added).
141. Id. at 627 n.36.
142. See Hanke, supra note 114.
[Vol. 30:809
Applying the FCA to Security Contractors in Iraq
consistent with its holding, seems forced to fit within the formal parame-
ters of later lower-court precedent. Perhaps sensing the malleability of
this foundation, the court utilized another Supreme Court case to buttress
its understanding of the supposed principle of Cohn: the U.S. govern-
ment must own the resources fraudulently obtained by a false claim
before the FCA is applicable. 143
b. United States v. McNinch
144
The Custer Battles court pointed to an "implicit affirmation" of the
government-ownership principle in a 1958 case that involved a com-
plaint by the federal government that defendants had caused a bank to
present false applications for credit insurance to the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA). 145 The issue in McNinch was whether false claims
under the FCA include a fraudulent application for credit insurance sup-
plied by the FHA, a federal agency, with a bank as an intervening agent
between the defendants and the FHA. 146 The McNinch Court noted that
the phrase "claim against the Government" from the FCA's statutory
language 47 was a part of "the provisions of a criminal statute... [that]
must be carefully restricted ... not only to their literal terms but to the
evident purpose of Congress in using those terms, particularly where
they are broad and susceptible to numerous definitions."' 148 In this light,
the Court found that "sensational congressional investigations" had
greatly informed the notion that the original purpose behind the FCA was
inextricably linked to the prevention of a "plundering of the public treas-
ury" especially with respect to private contracts of "the sale of provisions
and munitions to the War Department."' 149 The Court seemed to suggest
that an application for credit, because it was not factually similar to a
143. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 637.
144. 356 U.S. 595 (1958).
145. Id. at 596-97.
146. Id. at 597.
147. Id. at 598 n.5 (citing Rainwater v. U.S. 356 U.S. 590, 592 n.8 (1958) (discussing how the
original FCA statute possessed both criminal and civil sanctions). The FCA itself no longer carries
criminal penalties, although the "underlying fraudulent activity" may give rise to liability under
other statutes. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a), 3730(a) (2000). See also 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730 n.249 (2003).
148. McNinch, 356 U.S. at 598 (emphasis added). Cf Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 638
(discussing how the "expansion" of the meaning of "claim" via the 1986 amendment to the FCA,
and its legislative history, did not show legislative intent to include government payments of "non-
federal" funds (See S.Rep. No. 99-345, at 21 (1986), codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c))). However, as
this Note argues, the 1986 FCA amendment, as well as its legislative history, simply do not neces-
sarily preclude an interpretation of § 3729(c) to allow for liability under the circumstances in Custer
Battles.
149. McNinch, 356 U.S. at 599-600.
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War Department contract, did not fit within the ambit of the purpose of
the FCA, and thus would not constitute a false claim.1 50
In McNinch, in reference to the difference between the facts before
it and the congressional purpose behind the FCA, the Court asserted that
the "[FCA] was not designed to reach every kind of fraud practiced on
the Government."15' Because an application for credit insurance could be
seen to fit inside a broad meaning of the term "claim," the Court in
McNinch narrowed the meaning of "claim" by focusing on the congres-
sional purpose behind the FCA to prevent fraud on the War Depart-
ment.152 Also, the McNinch Court did indeed somewhat affirm Cohn by
quoting a relevant passage from that opinion in a footnote:
[I]t is clear, in the light of the entire context, that in the present stat-
ute, the provision relating to the payment or approval of a "claim
upon or against" the Government relates solely to the payment or
approval of a claim for money or property to which a right is as-
serted against the Government, based upon the Government's own
liability to the claimant.' 53
This passage may be read to support the Custer Battles court's con-
tention that the McNinch opinion is in harmony with Cohn. Specifically,
the FCA is only meant to address those claims that give rise to a "right"
against the government, and presumably rights can only arise if the gov-
ernment itself, from its own funds, is legally obligated to tender payment
to the claimant. However, within the context of the circumstances in
Custer Battles, this interpretation does not seem to be a necessary one.
The phrase "a claim upon or against" from the earlier version of the
FCA, as interpreted in Cohn and subsequently referred to by the Court in
MeNinch in the above-quoted footnote, does not appear in 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(1), which is the provision of the present version of the FCA
controlling the Custer Battles court's inquiry.' 54 The Supreme Court in
McNinch was also explicitly conscious of the fact that it was "construing
the provisions of a criminal statute."' 55 Comparatively, the Custer Battles
150. Id. at 599.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 599-600.
153. Id. at 600 n.] 0 (quoting Cohn, 270 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1926)).
154. Nor does this language appear in the statutory definition of claim. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c)
(2000).
155. Compare McNinch, 356 U.S. at 598, with Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 637 n.59. The
Custer Battles court noted the following:
Cohn and McNinch were interpreting an earlier version of the FCA that imposed both
criminal and civil sanctions. And while criminal statutes are usually given a more restric-
tive reading, the holdings in these cases regarding the definition of "claim" are still rele-
vant here because this interpretation is not dependent on a restrictive reading of the term
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action is simply a civil qui tam action in which the relators and the gov-
ernment seek only monetary damages; the modern-day FCA does not
itself carry criminal penalties, and this in turn may suggest that perhaps
the Custer Battles court should have adopted a broader interpretive
stance. 156
A plausible reading of the McNinch citation to Cohn, and what it
represents in terms of precedent, should include not only the nature of
the specific legal question before the Court in McNinch, but also the
McNinch Court's narrow interpretive approach to the FCA because of its
criminal provisions. 157 In the context of those facts, the McNinch Court
simply looked to Cohn to buttress its assertion that "an application for
credit insurance does not fairly come within the scope that Congress in-
tended the Act to have.', 158 Thus, McNinch does not necessarily lead to
the proposition that all disbursements in response to false claims must
arise from funds owned by the United States. Neither the facts nor the
context of the case necessitate that reading.
Interestingly, the Custer Battles court also recast the reasoning of
McNinch to achieve an affirmation of the government-ownership princi-
ple supposedly announced in Cohn. According to the court:
[I]n United States v. McNinch ... the Supreme Court ruled that a"claim" is a "demand for money or for some transfer of public
property" that requires the government to disburse public funds or
to "otherwise suffer immediate financial detriment."' 9
Note, however, the original passage from McNinch:
In normal usage or understanding an application for credit insurance
would hardly be thought of as a "claim against the government." As
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit said in this same context,
"the conception of a claim against the government normally con-
notes a demand for money or for some transfer of public prop-
11160erty. In agreeing to insure a home improvement loan the FHA
disburses no funds nor does it otherwise suffer immediate financial
detriment. It simply contracts, for a premium, to reimburse the lend-
ing institution in the event of future default, if any.161
and because the FCA has always been read broadly, even before it was amended to im-
pose only civil liability.
Id. (emphasis added).
156. See supra note 155.
157. McNinch, 356 U.S. at 597-98.
158. Id. at 599.
159. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 637.
160. United States v. Tieger, 234 F.2d 589, 591 (3rd Cir. 1956) (emphasis added).
161. McNinch, 356 U.S. at 598-99 (emphasis added).
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The Custer Battles court could have distinguished its facts from
McNinch by simply pointing out that the CPA "disbursed funds,"
whereas the FHA did not. Instead, the court focused on the "suffer...
financial detriment" clause from the above-quoted passage to affirm the
Cohn "principle" that the FCA requires the government to own the funds
that a false claim draws upon.' 62 This assertion is technically consistent
with other holdings from federal courts analyzing what constitutes a
claim under the FCA.163 However, when the Custer Battles court cited
McNinch, it inserted the word "public" between "disbursed" and
"funds.' 64 This insertion suggests that the court did not want to ac-
knowledge what seems apparent: McNinch itself provides limited guid-
ance to the issue in Custer Battles, even though McNinch can be framed
similarly to the later lower court precedent defining "claim" under the
FCA. The court ignored a much more important implication of the
McNinch decision-that the original congressional purpose behind the
FCA, to prevent fraud upon the War Department, 165 would not be served
by an overly formalistic interpretation of the statutory language.
c. Unites States v. Neifert- White Co. 166
The third principal case relied on by the Custer Battles court in-
volved a grain storage bin dealer who purposely overstated prices for his
bins on his customers' invoices. 167 His customers, seeking loans, then
presented the inflated invoices to the Commodity Credit Corporation
(CCC), a federal agency, which by regulation could only cover up to a
maximum of eighty percent of the purchase price. 68 Thus, if granted by
the CCC, the fraudulently inflated price would allow customers to re-
ceive more than eighty percent of the actual price paid to the dealer. Sub-
sequently, the United States charged the dealer under the FCA. The
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's determination that an applica-
tion for a CCC loan was not a claim under the FCA because it was not
"for payment of obligation owed by the government."'' 69 The Court held
that "the [FCA] should not be given [a] narrow reading" because it
"reaches beyond 'claims' which might be legally enforced, to all fraudu-
lent attempts to cause the Government to pay out sums of money." 70 At
162. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 637.
163. See cases cited supra note 131 and accompanying text.
164. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 637 (emphasis added).
165. See supra Part II.A.
166. 390 U.S. 228 (1968).
167. Id. at 230.
168. Id. at 230.
169. Id. at 229, 233.
170. Id. at 233.
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first blush, this statement would seem to allow FCA liability for fraudu-
lent contractors in Iraq, as the CPA "paid out" sums of money to Custer
Battles.
The Custer Battles court, however, read the language from Neifert-
White as an affirmation that only claims that involve the Government's
actual money fall within the meaning of "claim" under the FCA. In fact,
the court openly inserted "own" between "its" and "money" in its de-
scription of how the Court in Neifert- White distinguished its facts from
Cohn:
Neifert-White does not stand for the proposition that any request
that induces the government to write a check or to hand over money
is a "claim." Instead, consistent with Cohn, it holds that a "claim" is
any fraudulent attempt to cause the government to part with its own171money.
The court used this language to argue that the Neifert- White Court
distinguished Cohn from its facts because Cohn involved the United
States as a "bailee of goods that did not belong to the Unites States,"
whereas the loan applications in Neifert- White "involve[d] a false claim
for government property, even if the grantee had no legal right or 'claim'
to the loan."'1 72 However, the original language from Neifert-White also
suggests that the Court noted that the government was merely acting as a
"bailee" in Cohn and that is why Cohn did not control its decision. 73
Again, this language from Neifert-White fits within the lower-court
precedent that has, in the intervening years, come to define a claim as
necessarily involving government property. However, that language by
itself also does not necessarily eliminate a situation such as exists in Cus-
ter Battles, in which formal title may not exist, but the CPA's use and
reliance on "Iraqi" funds could suggest that the government paid for con-
tracts with what it both considered, and was in effect, "its own"
money. 174
171. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d 617, 637 (2005). Cf Neifert White, 390 U.S. at 231.
172. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 637.
173. See Neifert- White, 390 U.S. at 231.
174. The Neifert- White decision discusses McNinch:
This Court held [in McNinch] that since FHA 'disburses no funds nor does it otherwise
suffer immediate financial detriment,'.. . the transaction was not within the ambit of the
[FCA]. The Court emphasized the distinction between contracts of insurance against loss
such as those involved in McNinch, and transactions in which the United States pays or
lends money. For purposes of the present case, we need not reconsider the validity of this
distinction. It is sufficient to note that the instant case involves a false statement made
with the purpose and effect of inducing the Government immediately to part with money.
Id. at 232. Notice the last sentence and how its precise language could easily allow liability to attach
under the FCA with respect to the facts of Custer Battles or, on the other hand, how its language
could fit within the Custer Battles court's understanding of precedent defining claim.
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Perhaps the court should have noted more language from Neifert-
White in criticizing the storage bin dealer's reliance on the narrow con-
ception of "claim" under Cohn: "The language in [Cohn] upon which
[the storage bin dealer] relies cannot be taken as a decision upon a point
which the facts of the case did not present." 1 75 Analogously, the question
on the facts before the Neifert- White Court was whether a fraudulent loan
application utilizing "inflated" prices on invoices constituted a claim un-
der the FCA. The question was not whether the government, having paid
out money, actually had to prove ownership of that money. Again, simi-
lar to its understanding of Cohn and McNinch, the Custer Battles court's
use of the holding from Neifert-White seems only partly relevant to the
precise issue before it.
In conclusion, several questions might be asked with respect to the
court's use of Cohn, McNinch, and Neifert- White to argue that the FCA
does not apply to false claims involving funds from the "Iraqi owned"
DFI. Should a fraudulent claim for cigars realistically be described as a
request for "resources"? In this case, is it even remotely accurate to de-
scribe the CPA as merely a "custodian" or "bailee"? Does McNinch
really dictate a denial of FCA liability in an instance where a government
agency 176 "administers" non-U.S. funds? Does "administer" even appro-
priately or fully describe the CPA's use of the DFI in tendering payment
to security contractors performing vital U.S. interests in Iraq? And fi-
nally, did the "Iraqi people" or the Central Bank of Iraq actually own the
DFI funds in anything more than a nominal sense? The court did not an-
swer or address these questions through its use of Cohn, McNinch, and
Neifert-White. It followed precedent at the expense of a realistic
appraisal of the issue before it.
V. BETTER POLICY ALTERNATIVES
The three Supreme Court cases used by the Custer Battles court fail
to convincingly preclude liability for claims presented to the CPA that
drew upon funds in the possession of the government. A better approach
would have been to first provide a summary and history of the three Su-
preme Court cases and how the circuit courts have translated and devel-
oped the accurate holdings of those cases.1 77 The Custer Battles court
should have acknowledged the debatable applicability of precedent to the
unusual facts of the case before it and looked beyond simple formal
ownership interest categories. Under the FCA, a claim should be defined
175. Id. at 231.
176. The Custer Battles court later determined that the CPA was not an American agency for
purposes of the FCA. Custer Battles II, 444 F. Supp. 2d 678 (E.D. Va. 2006). See supra note 1.
177. See supra Part IV.
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by also considering the following: (1) the general policies behind the
FCA, as well as the policies behind the use of qui tam actions within the
FCA; (2) the implications of the intended congressional statutory expan-
sion of "claim" in 1986; and most importantly, (3) the nature of the CPA,
the CPA's use of the DFI, and the environment in which the contracts
were performed. If the court had pursued its analysis with these factors
as a guide, it would have likely held that a "mere" formal possession by
the CPA of the DFI source of funding fell within the scope of liability
intended by the FCA. Any contractor presenting a false claim to the
CPA, regardless of the title of the funds used to pay that claim, should be
liable in American courts for fraudulent activity that results in a disbursal
of funds. And, even if the three Supreme Court cases discussed above in
Part IV do establish that qui tam actions are only available when the
government has formal title to the money used to pay a false claim, an
exception in cases of possession should nevertheless be made in these or
similar circumstances.
First, if the court had found Custer Battles liable for its fraudu-
lent activity in this case, regardless of whether that activity resulted in a
draw specifically upon the U.S. Treasury or the DFI, the court would
have acted more consistently with the purposes behind the FCA and its
qui tam provision. Qui tam actions are specifically intended to prevent
fraud by allowing private attorneys general to act in the defense of the
taxpayers' interest. 178 The FCA originated as a response to widespread
fraud and abuse by contractors during the Civil War and Congress has,
within the last twenty years, expanded the reach of the FCA.179 Thus,
because the acts committed by Custer Battles in Iraq corresponded so
directly to the reasons behind the statute, any interpretation of case law
that cuts the other way should be suspicious. The Custer Battles court did
not properly appreciate the differences between the Supreme Court cases
it relied upon and the facts before it. For example, if the defendant in
Cohn had simultaneously defrauded the government of ammunition cru-
cial to properly fight a war, and some of the ammunition was "owned"
while some of it was merely "possessed," it is difficult to envision the
Cohn Court allowing an FCA claim only for the ammunition to which
the government had a formal "right." Cohn, properly read, applies when
the government acts as a bailee temporarily holding merchandise for a
third party, and not when the government is utilizing a possessory inter-
est to further its own vital interests. In this context, a purposive and
178. See supra Part II.A.
179. See supra Part H.A.; see generally supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text; see
Ruhnka, supra note 30.
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historical analysis of qui tam actions strongly suggests liability for "the
underlying fraudulent activity."1 80
Secondly, a plain language reading of the statute that defines
"claim" suggests liability for Custer Battles for the totality of its "fraudu-
lent activity." As discussed above, "claim" is statutorily defined as a re-
quest "for money.. . if the [United States] provides any portion of the
money . . ., or if the [United States] will reimburse [a] contractor ... for
any portion of the money.., which is requested or demanded."' 8 The
court correctly noted that the definition can be read either consistently
with the precedent defining "claim," or not; however, the definition was
written long after the three Supreme Court cases cited by the court were
decided, and the United States (through the CPA) certainly provided a
portion of the money that Custer Battles made fraudulent demands for.
The proper reading of this statute would allow FCA liability for "fraudu-
lent activity" when the United States provides a significant portion of the
money used to pay a claim. Even if title is still a dispositive factor,
however, a plain reading of the statute should allow for liability in cir-
cumstances where the same activity causes the United States to simulta-
neously pay with money both "owned" and "possessed." That interpreta-
tion seems more aligned with congressional and taxpayers' interests.
Maintaining formalist.distinctions, as the Custer Battles court did, allows
Custer Battles to escape liability for so-called Iraqi funds"' 2-funds
which could have been honestly spent and utilized by the CPA. The
funds received by Custer Battles, regardless of legal title, would probably
have saved an equal amount of funding from direct congressional appro-
priations and outlays from the U.S. Treasury, if those "Iraqi" funds
would have been available for legitimate ends. The court should have
simply held that a disbursal of funds by the government with an intent to
further a governmental interest would better fit the statutory language
defining claim.
Finally, the precedent utilized by the court simply does not dictate a
definitive result one way or the other in these circumstances. The CPA
could not be accurately described as merely a "bailee" or "custodian" of
the DFI. 183 Custer Battles repeatedly made fraudulent claims against the
CPA.18 4 If title to the funds is the only dispositive factor, then the court's
guiding rationale, or principle, that the FCA was not designed to prevent
180. Cf Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d 617, 635 (citing Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah
River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785 (4th Cir. 1999)).
181. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (2000) (emphasis added).
182. See supra notes 107-114 and accompanying text.
183. See supra Part IV.
184. Custer Battles I1, 444 F. Supp. 2d 678, 680-81 (E.D. Va. 2006).
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all "underlying fraudulent activity"'1 85 against the government, seems
oddly placed. As a result of the court's holding, Custer Battles (or other
fraudulent actors with similar arrangements involving the CPA) will be
punished in some instances of fraud and not in others even though the
conduct, the parties, and the transactions involved were the same.18 6
Thus, the same "underlying fraudulent activity" simultaneously does and
does not allow a claim.
Under the Custer Battles court's reasoning, two contractors both
presenting identically false claims to the CPA for the same type of con-
tracted work, would have different FCA liabilities based solely on the
source of funding chosen by the CPA from which to tender payment.
Tenuous formal distinctions leading to these sorts of scattershot effects
suggest a formulation of the law too inconsistent to justifiably stand for
the intent of Congress. Any precedent leading to different liabilities in
this scenario is ripe for clarification or revision.
The Custer Battles court should have held that in cases where a
fraudulent contractor presents false claims to a government agency that is
involved in the "administration" or "disbursal" of funds which are
clearly spent to further a vital government interest, then those claims
must fall within the terms of the FCA. This limited holding is not incon-
sistent with the above precedent defining "claim, 18 7 even under the Cus-
ter Battles court's interpretation. This broader holding would equally
prohibit all fraudulent claims by contractors such as Custer Battles,
unless the CPA had been disbursing funds in a particular circumstance
only on behalf and under the direction of a distinctly Iraqi, and non-
American, interest. That holding would also suggest a more realistic un-
derstanding of "interest" as encompassing more than a direct formal fi-
nancial detriment on the U.S. Treasury.1 88 In fact, because the American
government (in the form of the CPA)18 9 and the post-invasion Iraqi gov-
ernment had virtually the same functional identity at the time of the con-
tracts, 90 a distinction based on title that assumes at a fundamental level a
185. Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d. at 635 (citing Harrison, 176 F.3d at 785).
186. The CPA generally used cost-plus contracts in the early months of the occupation of Iraq.
See supra note 75.
187. See supra Part IV.
188. American "interests" that include financial consequence in Iraq that should fall within the
sphere of the FCA could encompass more than mere "financial detriments" directly or indirectly to
the "public fisc." The term "financial detriment," though, could include the additional "indirect"
costs to American taxpayers, that is, higher appropriations from Congress resulting from waste and
fraud of other sources of funding as a result of fraud by contractors.
189. But see Custer Battles II, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 688-89 (determining that, despite prevalent
American personnel and operations support and control, the CPA was an "international" entity not
subject to the FCA).
190. See Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 629 n.39.
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difference in interests between the two entities is formalism without sub-
stance. The relationship between the CPA and the Iraqi people at the
time of the contracts was paternal; Custer Battles went through no vet-
ting process by a non-CPA official, 191 nor was there any meaningful re-
view of the BIAP and ICE contracts by distinctly Iraqi representatives.1 92
Describing the DFI as "belonging" to the Iraqi people is simple political
sloganeering, and its basis as a matter of law based on these facts is
suspect. 193
The purposes behind the FCA and its qui tam provision, the plain
reading of the statutory definition of claim, and the context of the situa-
tion presented by the facts of Custer Battles all suggest a broader inter-
pretation of what sort of claims will be justiciable under the FCA than
the court was willing to undertake. In fairness, however, the court was
confronted with a particularly unusual situation with far-reaching ramifi-
cations that were political as well as legal, domestic as well as interna-
tional. Further, the court may have felt compelled to limit Custer Battles'
liability in these circumstances in light of the murkiness of the legal
status of the CPA itself.194 Perhaps the court sensed a danger in the effect
of an overbroad interpretation of the FCA upon the other political
branches of the government, at least in the sensitive context of planning
and contracting around the very dangerous and hostile contingencies in
Iraq immediately after the fall of Saddam Hussein. In any event, regard-
less of the court's premises, Congress should, in response to this holding,
clarify exactly when a claim will give rise to liability under the FCA.
VI. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES AND CONCLUSION
The issues that confront lawmakers regarding the use of private
contractors in Iraq are many. With respect to private security contractors
and their prevalent activities in theatres of war, Congress should re-
inspect its broader premises for privatization and how those premises fall
short in the context of modern-day Iraq. Of course, the interplay of Con-
gress and the Executive Branch in formulating policy with respect to
troop levels and deployment strategies in war zones dictates the level of
private contractor involvement. 195 A long term rethinking on the part of
both the legislative and the executive branches of the perhaps idealized
benefits of privatization in the security arena, as well as its very real po-
litical and military drawbacks, will likely provide a more coherent, and
191. Id. at 627.
192. Id. at 628-29.
193. See supra note 114.
194. See supra note 190.
195. See generally supra Part II.A.
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publicly accountable, view of performance and expenditure of funds in
the pursuit of security functions in hostile foreign environments.,1
96
With respect to the FCA, Congress should specify that when an
American agency (or "international" agency led and/or principally oper-
ated by American personnel) 197 disburses any funds to further any
American interest, those funds fit within the purview of the FCA's qui
tam provision. This broad notion of "claim" under the FCA would only
apply in limited circumstances-analogous to the circumstances in Cus-
ter Battles-yet it would carry the benefit of protecting millions of dol-
lars which would have otherwise been available to further the essential
prerogatives of the U.S. military or diplomatic officials through judicial
action. Congress should amend the FCA so that possession of funds (es-
pecially if possession is only encumbered in its dispersal of those funds
by vague international law formalities and political designations) would
give rise to liability under the FCA when: (1) a claim falsely or fraudu-
lently draws upon those funds, and (2) the agency is tendering payment
with those funds for contracts with American contractors that (3) furthers
an American interest, whether that interest be financial, military, politi-
cal, or otherwise. Mere "possession," as opposed to "ownership" in its
formalized sense of title, should not be the dispositive factor when courts
analyze whether FCA liability attaches for claims made in situations as
in Custer Battles.
Notwithstanding the suggestion for an expansion of the meaning of"claim," Congress should, at the very least, protect the present form of
the FCA qui tam provision. Recently, Senator Charles "Chuck" Grassley
and Representative James Sensenbrenner exhorted their colleagues to
maintain the present incentives for "whistleblowers" under the FCA's
qui tam provision; this exhortation was in response to a concerted effort
by certain lobbying groups to scale back the FCA's statutory language. 98
196. On January 4, 2007, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the "War Profiteering Prevention
Act of 2007," S.119, 110th Cong. § 1-2 (2007). The Act amends the federal code to prohibit profi-
teering and fraud involving a contract or the provision of goods or services in connection with a war,
military action, or relief or reconstruction activities within U.S. jurisdiction (including making mate-
rially false statements or representations or materially overvaluing any good or service with the
specific intent to make excessive profit). The Library of Congress, Thomas.gov,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c1 10:S. 119 (last visited Feb. 8, 2007). The Act also sets penal-
ties for violations, including up to twenty years' imprisonment and a fine of the greater of $1 million
or twice the gross profits or other proceeds. Id. The proposed bill makes criminal sanctions available,
and does not specifically mention or amend sections of the U.S. Code that correspond to the FCA.
Id.
197. See Custer Battles, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 622-23.
198. See Powell Goldstein, LLP, "Client Alert" (Apr. 15, 2005), http://www.pogolaw.com/
files/news-alerts/1612/Grassley,+Sensenbrenner+ 08.05.pdf. The website states the following:
In a June 14 [2005] letter to certain members of Congress, a coalition of seven conserva-
tive [healthcare provider] groups urged Congress to consider amending the FCA to limit
2007]
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 30:809
Senator Grassley, the principal architect of the 1986 amendments of the
FCA's qui tam provisions, is a vital force in Congress, seeking to uphold
the present form of the qui tam provision, and he appears to be dedicated
to a strong FCA. 199 Certainly, with respect to the virtually non-existent
accounting mechanisms in place in the early months of the CPA's Iraqi
reconstruction efforts, 200 a strongly worded and broadly interpreted qui
tam provision would allow for perhaps the only real deterrent against
contractors who may defraud the government of vital funds in foreign
war zones, whether those funds are owned or possessed by the
government.
Finally, in light of the inherent government oversight deficiencies
and challenges in theatres of war, there are signs that the DoD is also less
than fully committed to institutional oversight per se.20 1 Thus, whether
that decision has been political, or whether it is compelled by lack of re-
sources or other reasons, a strongly worded and broadly applied statutory
definition of claim under the FCA's qui tam provision will provide
courts and relators greater oversight of both fraudulent expenditures as
well as wasteful expenditures which bear a causal relationship to in-
creased appropriations of the public fisc. A more broadly phrased and
defined claim in the FCA would also close the escape hatch provided by
the analysis of the Custer Battles court and eliminate the unwarranted
the incentives for whistleblowers . . . . In particular, the letter urged that (i) a whistle-
blower must have engaged in documented efforts to remedy the fraud that is the subject
of the FCA action in order to be eligible to share in the recovery, (ii) the rewards and le-
gal fees for whistleblowers and their attorneys be capped at $1 million and (iii) any funds
recovered in FCA cases must be returned to the agency that was defrauded and not con-
tributed to the Department of Justice enforcement budget or the U.S. Treasury. The letter
asserts that the qui tam provisions of the FCA could encourage fraud by incentivizing po-
tential whistleblowers to allow fraudulent schemes to fester, and that the risk of exclusion
from federal health care programs forces providers to accept large settlements to avoid
prosecution under the FCA .... On July 29 [2005], Senator Charles Grassley (the author
of the 1986 qui tam provisions) and Representative James Sensenbrenner sent a letter
urging their colleagues in Congress to preserve the existing provisions of the FCA and
"the public/private partnerships created by the act." The letter notes that "an effort has
begun to destroy the whistleblower and public/private partnership provisions of the
[FCA] by limiting the incentives the act provides for whistleblowers to come forward and
use the act" and asserts that the proposed reforms "will make it impossible to mobilize
private resources to fight fraud." In fact, Grassley has this year authored legislation and
chaired hearings targeted at ensuring the federal government is utilizing the FCA (includ-
ing its qui tam provisions) to maximum effectiveness.
Id.
199. See id.
200. See supra Part II.C.
201. See Eckholm, supra note 53. Some Members of Congress may also be less than concerned
with full oversight and accountability for contract procurement policy. See David S. Cloud, Military
Contractor Pleads Guilty to Bribery, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2006, at AI I (contractor plead guilty to
bribing or attempting to bribe three Members of Congress).
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good fortune of fraudulent American contractors who happen to have
been paid by nominally non-American funds.
